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Dear Members of the Faculty, dear Students, 
 
This Meijers lecture holds a novum: it will be the first one to be held, not in 
our native language, but in English. The request to do so came from the 
Onderzoeksbestuur, taking into consideration the growing number of 
faculty members from abroad. The research board nevertheless left the 
choice up to me to speak either in Dutch or in English. After some 
consideration, some weighing and balancing, I deliberately chose to present 
my lecture in English. But did I? Did I really choose? Is my choice the result 
of a decision of my conscious mind? Or is the conscious mind just a 
“kwebbeldoos”, a chatterbox, as some neuroscientists say, and the idea of 
choice, of free will, a fabrication of this “chatterbox”? These are bold 
claims, which run against our intuitions of the capacities of men. But 
counter-intuitive claims are not necessarily wrong, and we might ask what 
law can learn from other sciences, such as the neurosciences. 
The idea that the law can learn from other scientific disciplines, is one of 
the reasons of this Faculty to develop a research master, which is called 
“External Perspectives on Law”. Its aim is to train law students to study law 
from different perspectives, such as economics, psychology, and 
anthropology and to learn from their knowledge and approaches.  
This lecture, I will nevertheless reverse the perspective. Although law 
can definitely learn from the other sciences, the other sciences can also 
learn from the law. That, at least, is the proposition I would like to develop 
in this lecture. To test its credibility, I will discuss the challenging claim by 
the neurosciences: the claim that the FREE WILL does not exist.  
The structure of my lecture is as follows. I will first give a brief outline of 
the claim of the neurosciences that the will and free will do not exist; I than 
move over to the field of law, and reconstruct the law’s concept of the will; 
in the last part of the lecture I will invoke a bit of philosophy of language to 
test the validity of the claim of the neurosciences. 
 
The topic of the FREE WILL used to be the province of theology and 
philosophy. Augustine and Luther, for example, considered the idea of a 
FREE WILL blasphemous in light of God’s omnipotence, whereas Erasmus and 
Kant reasoned that moral responsibility presupposes FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
But the recent and rapid developments in the neurosciences have changed 
the character of the debate. The arguments for and against the existence of 
the FREE WILL are no longer primarily based on logic or moral intuitions, but 
on scientific evidence – on what is called the “brute facts of nature”, or, 
shortly, facts. 
According to brain researchers, such as Dick Swaab and Victor Lamme, 
to mention two famous Dutch neuroscientists, scientific research on the 
brain showcases that we erroneously identify ourselves with the conscious 
mind, with REASON. We still are inclined, they argue, to consider our 
decisions, at least in principle, as the result of an act of deliberation.  
This view, the view to identify ourselves with our conscious mind, has a 
long and respectable history. Plato gave us the beautiful metaphor of the 
human soul as a charioteer, driving two horses. The charioteer represents 
the faculty of REASON, whereas the horses represent the impulses of DESIRE 
and TEMPER.  Although it is a difficult task for REASON to hold DESIRE and 
TEMPER in check – we are often led off( the right) track, due to a weakly 
developed REASON and a lusty DESIRE – Plato’s message is an optimistic one: 
REASON, if trained appropriately, is able to keep the impulses of the soul in 
check. Just as we blame the charioteer when the chariot is on the wrong 
track, we blame ourselves, that is, our conscious mind, our REASON, for not 
having  mastered our impulses and inclinations.  
But the message on the role of our conscious mind in decision-making 
from the neurosciences is less favourable. In his bestseller WIJ ZIJN HET BREIN 
(“We are the brain”), Dick Swaab demonstrates that much of what we call 
our identity is, in fact, prepared in the womb, during pregnancy. Hetero- or 
homosexuality, for example, are not a personal choice, neither an effect of 
social pressure, but can, according to Swaab, be explained in terms of 
characteristics of the brain – in particular the size (!) and functioning of the 
hypothalamus, which, in turn, is causally related to an increase or decrease 
of particular chemicals during pregnancy.  
A second example. According to Swaab, we correctly connect the degree 
of self-control to moral consciousness, in that aggressive impulses are, 
among others, restrained by the cerebral cortex (what we call the “frontale 
hersenschors”). This part of the brain is crucial for moral judgment. But who 
or what masters the cerebral cortex? What happens if this part of the brain 
is damaged? Some war veterans and Altzheimer patients, says Swaab, 
demonstrated to be more violent and aggressive than they used to be 
before the damage on the cerebral cortex. And when the development of 
the cerebral cortex of the foetus is damaged during pregnancy, because of 
smoking, bad nourishment, or the use of medicine, there is also an 
increased chance of violent and aggressive behaviour later on in life.  
This raises the question whether it is our conscious mind that governs 
our (moral) behaviour, or that the conscious mind itself is the product of 
the complex interplay of different parts of the brain, whereas the brain, in 
turn, is primarily the collective product of the generic background (wat is 
dat? Of genetic?) and the formation during pregnancy. The title of Swaab’s 
book, WE ARE THE BRAIN, answers this question unequivocally: the conscious 
mind is a product of the brain, and the brain is the product of genetic 
material and chemistry. 
Victor Lamme, in his book DE VRIJE WIL BESTAAT NIET (The Free Will does not 
exist) is as unambiguous as Swaab about the role of the conscious mind in 
our behaviour; he only uses a more rhetorical vocabulary. According to 
Lamme, we should consider the brain as an extremely complex computer. 
The brain processes all kind of stimuli, stemming from different parts of the 
brain, and it is the strongest stimulus that will be decisive. It is this stimulus, 
the strongest in relation to other stimuli, which accounts for what we call 
the decision. 
What, then, creates the conscious mind? And what is its function? Both 
Swaab and Lamme consider the conscious mind as a by-product of the 
complex organisation of the brain. They state that the BRAIN PRODUCES THE 
SELF, just as the kidney produces urine. The function of this “SELF” is the 
experience of a unity in the multitude of different stimuli, feelings and 
experiences. The experience of a SELF accounts for the continual need to 
explain our behaviour. 
And the explanation runs as follows: If there is no external force that 
caused our behaviour, it must be an internal force. That internal force 
cannot be some arbitrary stimulus – that wouldn’t be an explanation at all. 
It must therefore be located in the SELF,  from the experience of unity, and 
therefore from the centre where all action is set in motion. If the SELF is the 
cause of action, than it is because the SELF willed that action.  
Now, this account of the conscious mind, says Lamme, accounts for the 
vocabulary of WILL, INTENTIONALITY, and DECISION that is so characteristic for 
the way we interpret our actions and those of others. 
But just as the SELF is an illusion, so is the WILL. For our action is not set in 
motion because of some reason that we deliberately choose, but, 
conversely, a reason is invented by our conscious mind in order to explain 
the choice that the brain has already made. The upshot is that the 
explanation of the conscious mind falsely reverses the order of things. 
Lamme therefore calls the conscious mind a chatterbox. It tells a tale, 
but it is just a narrative. The truth is that there are no such things as the SELF 
or the WILL, let alone that a FREE WILL would exist. The only facts are the brute 
facts of nature, that is, the hardware of the brain, and the electrical and 
chemical signals of its neurons. 
 
This, albeit in rough outline, is the position of the neurosciences with 
regard to the phenomena of the WILL and FREEDOM OF THE WILL. Its conclusion 
seems devastating for the major areas of law – such as contract law, tort 
law and criminal law.  Because legal responsibility, a key concept in law, is 
primarily based on the assumption that a human being is, at least in 
principle, capable to determine its WILL and to act accordingly, an 
explanation that Swaab and Lamme call consider a reversal of the order of 
things. To deny man the faculty of the WILL seriously affects the legal and 
cultural landscape that men have inhabited for millennia.  
But Victor Lamme’s conclusion that there exists no such thing as the WILL 
seems  drawn rather hastily. The problem is not the contention of the 
neurosciences that the will is a construction – for an analysis of the legal 
concept of the will reveals that even the law conceives of the will, not as a 
brute fact of nature, but as a construction. The problem is that Swaab and 
Lamme stick to the naïve positivistic idea that only brute facts of nature are 
true facts, and everything else mere illusions. A bit of philosophy of 
language will suffice to exhibit that this world, although composed of 
physical particles, not only consists of brute facts of nature, such as 
molecules and biological organisms, but also houses a social world – and 
the facts of the social world, although a different kind of fact, are as real as 
the alleged brute facts of nature. 
But let us first turn to the law and answer the question what kind of 
phenomenon the will is from a legal point of view. The regulation of the 
juristic act (articles 3:33-35 BW) offers a sophisticated view on the legal 
concept of the will. Article 3:33 states that the juristic act requires a will, 
aimed at a legal consequence, and expressed through a statement or 
declaration. Now, if we focus on the will, what happens if I wasn’t able to 
determine my will properly at the moment of the declaration? With respect 
to the will, two interesting questions arise.  
First: how do I know that my will at the moment of the declaration 
wasn’t my true will? And, second, how does the other party know whether 
or not I expressed my true will at the moment of my declaration?  
To make these questions more tangible, I will offer a concrete, albeit 
imaginary case. Suppose that I offered for sale my apartment in 
Amsterdam, November last year. With the profit I want to live near Pic de 
Bugarach, in the South West of France, for I believe that the world will 
perish on December 21 (2012), when the Maya calendar ends, but that I will 
be safe on this mountain. When a prospective buyer asks me the reason I 
sell the house, of course I don’t mention the true reason for selling the 
house,– I want him to buy the house, not to join me to Pic de Bugarach. The 
standard reason I give satisfies him, as does the reasonable price I ask for 
the apartment, so we closed the deal. But a few days later, just before the 
conveyance, and a week before Dooms Day, I wonder what happened to 
me, how could I truly believed that the world would perish December 21? I 
wonder whether I might have been intoxicated by the use of tranquilizers, 
which I’d bought via Internet. I definitely do not want to sell the house and I 
decide to invoke the exception of article 34.  
This article 34 states that the will is supposed not to cohere  with the 
declaration, if a mental disorder prevented a reasonable judgment of the 
involved interests. But how do I know that I suffered a mental disorder at 
the time of the declaration? The law states: that is the case if the juristic act 
is disadvantageous for the mentally disturbed person at the time of the 
declaration.  
Now, it is clear that, at the time of the declaration, I believed that the 
juristic act was advantageous for me. So, what justifies my present 
judgment that the juristic act is, in fact, disadvantageous? What makes me 
sure, to put it differently, that my present mental state is sound, and that it 
was unsound in November, last year? For in November, I would have 
judged the other way around. My own conviction, therefore, cannot be the 
proper criterion to determine whether or not the juristic act is 
disadvantageous. What I need, is a criterion to assess the soundness of my 
conviction. I therefore need a criterion that is external to my own feelings 
or inclinations.  
The law gives such an external criterion. It is the criterion of 
reasonableness. According to article 3:34, we suffer a mental disorder when 
we lack a reasonable judgment. But when do we lack a reasonable 
judgment? That is the case when we act against our interests. We act 
against our interests, when the juristic act is disadvantageous for us. But 
when is a juristic act disadvantageous for us? The only answer is an appeal 
to reasonableness. In order to answer this question, I have to determine 
whether I judged like a reasonable person, that is, whether a reasonable 
person in similar circumstances would consider the juristic act clearly as 
disadvantageous.  
From the analysis of article 34 we can draw two conclusions. First, what 
we call our true will is, according to the law, not identical to the inclination, 
that is, to the net result of the stimuli in the brain. The stimuli may cause 
my acts, as Swaab and Lamme state, but whether these acts are also truly 
willed, and not the effect of an aberration or thoughtlessness, is something 
different. My true will is what I reasonably could have willed at the time of 
the juristic act. The conclusion is that what we call the will, is not the 
inclination on the level of the brain – a brute fact of nature – but the 
positive judgment on the inclination.  
And that judgement is a construction. 
The analysis of the legal concept of the juristic act reveals a second 
aspect of the will. It reveals that we have to resort to public standards in 
order to determine whether or not the will is my true will. For I have to 
reflect upon my real interests, and to assess the proper means to achieve 
these interests. In doing so, I already left the solipsism of my own brain, and 
have entered the social world of family, work and authorities in which I 
participate, each with their values, policies and standards of 
reasonableness.  
It is with regard to these public standards, that I consider my initial sale’s 
offer to be an aberration. As I resort to public standards of reasonableness, 
my true will is not a private phenomenon, but a social construction.  
If we determine the will from the perspective of the other party, the 
buyer, the conclusion is similar. Article 35 states that, if the buyer could 
reasonably assume that my declaration and behaviour expressed my true 
will, I have to stand by the agreement, even if I suffered from a mental 
disorder at the time of the declaration. The will, attributed to me by the 
other party, is what reasonably can be inferred from my declaration and 
behaviour in these particular circumstances. And as the criterion of 
reasonableness refers to public standards of behaviour, embodied in what 
Holmes called “the reasonable and prudent man”, the will attributed to me, 
is, firstly, something that is constructed, and secondly, not a private, but a 
public phenomenon. 
We are now in the position to define the legal concept of the will more 
precisely, both from the perspective of the person who acts, as from the 
other party:  
- First: the will is something we attribute to others and to ourselves.  
- Second: an act is willed if, according to public standards of common 
behaviour, it is reasonable to suppose that I, or the other person, willed 
this act.  
  
The legal concept of the will holds a highly sophisticated view on the 
will, which we owe to Meijers, and we have gotten accustomed to it, so 
much so, that we almost forget how revolutionary and bold this concept of 
the will still is. What seems to be private to the utmost, my personal will, is 
not private at all, but a phenomenon that emerges in and through the 
handling of public standards. The will is a judgment, not a brute fact of 
nature.  
In this respect, there is a remarkable resemblance between the legal 
concept of the will and the findings of the neurosciences, according to 
which the will is something that we invent – more precisely: that the brain 
invents: a construction, not a “brute fact of nature”.  
But there is also a huge difference between the law and the 
neurosciences. The neuroscience concludes that, as the will is a mere 
construction, something the brain invented in order to explain behaviour, it 
therefore does not really exist; it is just an illusion.  
The law, by contrast, considers the will not as an illusion, but as an 
objective fact of the world. I think the law is correct. I think the law is 
correct, because the facts of social life are not less real than the brute facts 
of nature, although they exist only because we believe them to exist. 
And n order to substantiate this claim, I shall briefly discuss the nature of 
institutional facts. That is the bit philosophy I promised you at the outset. 
The distinction between brute facts of nature on the one hand, and 
social or institutional facts on the other, is from the philosopher John 
Searle. He was a pupil of John Austin, who developed the theory of speech 
acts.  
In his wonderful book “The Construction of Social Reality”, Searle offers 
an answer on the problem that, ‘although there are portions of the real 
world that exist only because we believe them to exist, many facts 
regarding these things are nevertheless “objective” facts in the sense that 
they are not a matter of your or my preferences, evaluations, or moral 
attitudes.’ Examples of such facts are the fact that I am a Dutch citizen, that 
this piece of paper is a 20 Euro bill, that my nephew got married on 
December 14, that I am the owner of this bicycle, and that FC Ajax won the 
Intercontinental Cup in 1995. These facts contrast differ from such facts as 
that the Mont Blanc has snow and ice near the summit or that water 
consists of consists of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. The latter 
facts are, arguably, totally independent of any human opinions. Searle calls 
the latter facts “brute” facts of nature. 
The former facts – the Euro bill, my citizenship – are called institutional 
facts, because they require human institutions for their existence. In order 
that this piece of paper is be a 20 Euro bill, there has to be the human 
institution of money. After all, this piece of printed-paper has hardly any 
value in itself – it has, so to speak, no intrinsic value, contrary to the gold 
coins of the old days (although the fact that gold has value is also based on 
an assigned function to gold). It is worth 20 Euro only because we 
collectively agree upon the fact that these bills have this value.  
Here something magical  happens: pieces of worthless paper become 
valuable only because the function to possess this value is assigned to them 
and we collectively accept this assigned function. It is this assigned function 
that turns these worthless pieces of paper, that is, these brute facts of 
nature, into money.  
The formula of assigning a function to an object is: X counts as Y in 
context Z. In our example: this paper bill (X) counts as a 20 Euro bill (Y) 
when authorized by the ECB (Z). The latter condition is of course the most 
complicated element of the formula. For the ECB is itself an institution, a 
complex organisation with powers, duties and procedures. 
To assign a function to an object is a necessary, though not sufficient 
condition to turn it into an institution. In order to become an institution, we 
have to accept it collectively and to behave accordingly. The institution of 
money is our collective behaviour towards money: the fact that I believe 
that you believe that we all believe that these pieces of paper are worth 20 
Euro. As long as there is a collective acceptance or recognition of the 
validity of the assigned function to these paper bills, the institution of the 
Euro exists. The Euro-crisis illustrates very well that acceptance and trust 
are necessary conditions for the existence of an institution.  
The example of money exhibits that we must differentiate between the 
institution of money, and the objects that are called money: the coins and 
paper bills. The objects owe their status as money not to their physical 
qualities, but to the assigned function. If we study the physical 
characteristics of the coins and paper bills, we might discover a lot about 
the alloy, seal and ink, but it will reveal nothing about the institution of 
money. Money is not the coins and not the paper bills; money is the 
collective behaviour of people towards money: it is the whole network of 
practices and rules of owning, buying, selling, earning, paying for services 
and paying off debts, etc.  
The institution of money is paradigmatic for all institutions. We can find 
them everywhere, especially in law. In fact, the law is one, huge, and 
complex network of institutions. Property, for example, is not an intrinsic 
feature of objects, but it is an assigned function to objects. Property is not 
the object owned – the brute fact – but the collective behaviour with 
regard to this object, based upon a belief in the existence of property. It is 
the cluster of rights, powers, and duties that define property. 
That is a different way of saying that money, property, as well as 
marriage, parenthood, elections, academic degrees and chairs, to mention 
a few more, are social constructions. But are they illusions? 
 
Now, I think that even Swaab and Lamme will agree that money is not an 
illusion, but an objective fact of our world. After all, they enjoy the 
convenience of a pension and salary, got their research financed by grants, 
and get their share of the sales from their bestsellers.  
But if they admit that money exists, they have to admit too that 
institutional facts are part of the world, although they do not have a precise 
location; and they do not reveal their features by mere observation. For the 
institution is not only what people do (that could be observed, in a way), 
but also what they believe about what they are doing, as well as what they 
believe they ought to do – aspects that cannot be observed, but that 
require interpretation. The institution is, in one word, an elusive 
phenomenon, a phenomenon that is everywhere and nowhere at the same 
time. 
The step to the institution of “the will”, and in its wake “the free will”, 
can now be made rather easily. An act is willed, we said, if, according to 
public standards of common behaviour, it is reasonable to suppose that I, 
or the other person, willed this act. The will is, therefore, an assigned 
function to a person according to the formula: X (behaviour) counts as Y 
(will) in context Z (kind of relation/person/expectation, etc.). 
I agree with Swaab and Lamme that the will cannot be found in the 
brain; and that, therefore, it makes no sense to even consider the 
possibility of a free will somewhere in the hardware of the brain. Their 
mistake is, what is called, a category-mistake: they fail to see that the will 
does not belong to the category of biology – it does not describe a feature 
of the human organism, such as blood pressure – but that it belongs to the 
social world.  
Only if we consider the Euro, the UN, property, calendars, and New Year 
Receptions to be mere illusions, we may call the will and the free will 
illusions too. But to accept that option, is to wipe out the social world with 
its institutions of law, science and art, and to find us in a naked, nasty world 
of brute facts only. 
Although I am convinced that the law can learn a lot from the 
neurosciences, I believe that the reverse is true as well. The aim of the 
proposed research master is precisely that: to form a bridge between the 
law and other disciplines. This lecture hopes to contribute to this goal.  
Thank you very much. 
 
